Italy and Albania: The political and economic alliance and the Italian invasion of 1939 by Tase, Peter
62
Italy and Albania: The political and economic 
alliance and the Italian invasion of 1939
Peter Tase, Research Fellow
Council of Hemispheric Affairs, Washington, D.C., USA
Abstract
As the successful coup d’etat of Rome in October 27 – 29, 1922, successfully unfolded 
and Benito Mussolini emerged into power, the threat of invasion and spread of fascism 
was looming over southeastern Europe and North African countries of Ethiopia, Libya 
and Somalia. Mussolini’s intentions would not be perceptible until October, 1935, the 
invasion of Ethiopia and consequently almost four years later with the invasion of 
Albania in April 7th, 1939, which is considered by many as the prelude to World War 
II. Italy’s role and support towards the implementation of infrastructure projects and 
economic development initiatives in Albania proved to be essential. The fascist regime 
of Benito Mussolini was also a strategic ally for King Zog I who was in a desperate need 
to establish a stable government and secure his monarchy. Although King Zog I came 
to power with the immense help of Yugoslavia, months later he established strong ties 
with Italy and worked tirelessly to foster strategic bilateral relations with Mussolini’s 
administration. 
Italo-Yugoslav Relations improved greatly after the signing of a bilateral agreement 
in March 25, 1937, therefore Benito Mussolini had the green light from the Yugoslav 
government – which brought King Zog I into power in December, 1924 – to storm with 
loans, equipment and human assets the newly created Albanian government which 
later would become a Kingdom under the rule of Zog I. The focus of this Essay will be 
the impact of Italian – Albanian Strategic Alliance, a detailed analysis on the pact of 
Tirana (1926), the Italian Strategic Interests on western Balkans and its subsequent 
invasion in April, 1939. 
Keywords: Italy, Albania, The National Bank of Albania, The Pact of Tirana, Benito 
Mussolini, Ahmet Zogu, Società per lo Sviluppo Economico dell’Albania (SVEA) 
Introduction 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Albania existed as an agrarian nation run by 
local chieftains, except for intermittent short-lived central governments, until King Zog 
I, with the help of Yugoslavia, secured absolute power in December, 1924. With wide 
support from the people of Albania, Ahmet Zogu was able to forge a strong economic 
alliance with Italy which strengthened the emerging centralized government and gave 
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Albanians a sense of nationhood.)1 For fourteen years the Italian-Albanian alliance 
developed and functioned to the benefit of both countries, ending only with the 
Italian invasion of Albania in April 7th, 1939. This essay will examine the benefits of this 
alliance and the reasons leading to the shocking reversal on the part of the Italians on 
the eve of WWII.2 
Establishment of the Italo-Albanian Alliance 
King Zogu, the architect of the Italo-Albanian alliance, established a foreign policy that 
was an important element in his political program, as well as his economic program. 
In January, 1925, Zogu sent a letter to Mussolini pledging alliance and Mussolini 
responded immediately by expressing his recognition of the Republic of Albania and its 
Government. At the same time, Zogu’s administration was overwhelmed by different 
European companies offering to invest in all branches of the Albanian economy. These 
offers consisted of things such as the construction of railways, docks, mines and 
drainage schemes, as well as oil industry and banking development. Unfortunately, 
Albania, still without paper currency and using gold coins, was facing difficulties in 
building a modern fiscal and money economy, and Zogu understood his country 
needed a national bank. The easiest way to achieve this was to establish an economic 
relationship with a strong country. Surrounded by pro-Italian cabinet members and 
convinced that Britain was standing behind Italy in order to offset the support France 
was giving to Yugoslavia, King Zogu openly announced his intentions to cooperate fully 
with Italy and turned his back on the Yugoslav government who had brought him to 
power. Thus began a fourteen year period (1925-1939) of Italian companies pouring 
wealth and resources into Albania to reconstruct this poor agrarian country. In the 
spring of 1925 two important concessions were signed with Italy; the first was the 
right to found a national bank and the second was the approval of the establishment 
of an Italian company (SVEA), to develop the Albanian economy. The National Bank 
of Albania (Banca Nazionale D’Albania) was in truth an Italian bank operating under 
Italian law and its reserves were in Rome. This institution offered financial services to 
the young government that some other financial institutions did not; however, through 
the agreement, the Italians had the right to keep the majority of shares (51% against 
49% to the Albanians). This made it possible for an unexpected development whereby 
the Italian banks secured the majority of title and deeds through fraud and corruption. 
When discovered, this caused a scandal and resulted in the resignation of the Albanian 
finance minister, who, it was revealed, had been awarded one million gold francs for 
committing this fraudulent activity on behalf of the Italian government. Unfortunately, 
1 Prior to December, 1924 the Fan S. Noli administration was in power (June, 1924 – December, 1924). Its overthrow was rather 
unfortunate in that it had come to power as the result of a democratic revolution and was considered to be the first democratic 
government in the Balkans. This change of government was welcomed by Italy which was planning to take a vital role in the 
Albanian economy and infrastructure.
2 Sharp, Walter R.; Kirk, Grayson, Contemporary International Politics (New York, NY: Rinehart & Company, Inc. 1944), pp. 664-666.
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it did not end there, the bank funds had been administered by the Società per lo 
Sviluppo Economico dell’Albania (SVEA), the development company to improve the 
Albanian economy, which was, in fact, a subsection of the Italian Finance Ministry. 
While the funds administered by this institution were indeed spent on infrastructure 
and public works, for example development of oil resources, it just so happened that 
the contracts would be awarded to those firms preferred by the Italian government.3 
Undoubtedly, Albania would never have become developed economically without the 
presence of foreign aid and loans. Above all the Italians were better than the Yugoslavs 
in being the ambassadors of westernizing Albania. Interestingly, in December, 1924, 
when Zogu was first raised to power, he was but a Serbian puppet. However, by June, 
1925, with the Italo-Albanian alliance, Albania had become an Italian province without 
a prefect. At every opportunity Zogu referred to Mussolini as a great leader and said 
that he was inspired by Mussolini from early on, though he seemed not to want to 
become dependent on a sole foreign partner and invited investment from other 
countries as well. However, the Italian government demanded that Albania recognize 
the declaration of Paris which established Albania as an Italian protectorate with Italy 
expected to provide both abundant money and arms. 
The Pact of Tirana – 1926 
The multidimensional relations between Italy and Albania reached yet a new level 
with the signing of the Tirana Pact on November 27, 1926, which brought 200,000 
francs in aid that was followed quickly with other means of assistance. The treaty 
would last five years and included these two important points: 
Article 1: Italy and Albania will recognize that any disturbance threatening the political, 
legal and territorial status quo of Albania is contrary to their common political interests. 
Article 2: In order to safeguard the above mentioned interests the two countries will 
undertake to afford each other mutual support and cordial cooperation: they also will 
commit not to make any political or military agreements with other powers prejudicial 
to the interests of either Italy or Albania. 
With the signing of this agreement Mussolini promised that he would make a gift 
to Ahmed Zogu of several million lire, and Italy would provide significant assistance 
to develop the Albanian military and economy. Zogu’s government now became 
dependent in every way on the Italian plans towards Albania. At the same time, it was 
a fruitful strategy to balance the strengths of the adversaries in the Balkan conflicts. 
However, with Albania so firmly planted on the side of Italy, Yugoslavia tried to assuage 
3 Marmullaku, Ramadan, Albania and the Albanians (Christopher Hurst.1975, pp50-150) 
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her feelings of insecurity by causing trouble at Albania’s northern borders for the next 
two years. 
In 1928, with the Yugoslav troops threatening at the northeastern border, Ahmed 
Zogu declared in front of the House of Commons his intentions to become the king of 
Albania. Italy immediately began to throw monetary support his way. To bolster the 
Albanian economy and transportation infrastructure, Italy signed another agreement 
with Albania in June 26, 1931. In it, Italy offered to subsidize the Albanian budget 
by extending a loan of one hundred million gold francs (L 6,600,000). These new 
measures were taken to make the Albanian economy more stable by balancing the 
country’s budget and facilitating public works. By this time, Italy had established a 
committee with four members which had a similar role to that of SVEA during the late 
1920’s. This commission monitored the financial affairs of all ministries, and ironically, 
Italian members of the committee had a veto power on outlay in order to ensure that 
Italy had enough financial control to check corruption. However, this agreement did 
assure a positive relationship between the two countries for years to come. 
Through the years, Albania accepted a greater number of Italian advisers, some to 
exercise even more authority than before, and in the same vein, agreed to install a 
number of Italian technical experts, whose advice was not solely restricted to financial 
and economic matters; they also consulted on public works and oil concessions around 
the country. At every turn, the Italians continued to agree to extend their manpower 
contributions and financial assistance in all areas of Albanian economy. Italy’s generous 
support was so impressive that they even forgave a loan of 100 million gold francs, of 
which only 20 million had been paid back by the Albanian government, when this 
agreement was signed in June, 1931. Paradoxically, a new loan of nine million gold 
francs was made, plus another three million that Mussolini offered spontaneously in 
1935. Furthermore, the Italian government granted another loan of about ten million 
gold francs which was for the development of agriculture, to be payable in five years; 
this loan had only a 1% interest, made possible by a guarantee from the Italian oil 
concession in Albania which was already reaping huge profits. Topping this, Italy 
granted another loan of three million gold francs, this time interest free, to be used 
for the establishment of the tobacco monopoly in the country; this amount had to 
be liquidated in a period of fifteen years with a minimum of 200,000 Lire paid each 
year. Lastly, Italy offered a loan of 40 million gold francs in annual installments of eight 
million gold francs, with the money to be spent on the construction of public works 
which would be monitored by the Italian specialists. Thus, with one loan after another, 
the Italians had their fingers fully into every segment of the Albanian economy. 
A particularly important project to the Albanian economy was the construction 
and modernization of the port of Durrës as a result of an agreement made in Rome 
between the two governments. The structure of the harbor and the infrastructure was 
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improved considerably after the Italians took entire control of the construction of the 
main section of it. In addition, another agreement was signed in 1936 allowing Italy’s 
interference in, or regulation of, Albanian finance, customs, revenues, exports and 
imports through this and other ports, which channeled even more profits back to Italy. 
One of the most lucrative industries in the country was oil: it was managed after WWI 
by British Petroleum until the Italians began to move into this sector in 1920. 
Eventually, 300,000 Italian émigrés came to settle in Albania. Italian schools opened 
everywhere and the major cities of Albania were given Italian names. The outcome 
of the Italian interference was really a de facto colonization of Albania which had its 
positive impact in regards to development of the import/export trade in the interwar 
period. Mussolini once declared, “Italy’s policy in Albania is quite clear and absolutely 
straight forward. Its sole object is to preserve and to respect the independent status 
of this small country, which for centuries has lived in friendship with us” it would 
take another three years to reveal the true intentions of Italy towards Albania.4 
Unfortunately, the small country of Albania could not have been stabilized and would 
have sunk into anarchy had Italy not stepped up to take the helm of this newly formed 
nation. 
Italian contributions to every aspect of Albanian economy and culture completely 
transformed Albania in a matter of two decades. Thanks to the Italian assistance the 
total exports in 1938 amounted to 10.2 million gold francs and the principal items 
were crude oil, cheese, eggs and livestock. Imports exceeded 18.9 million gold francs, 
and consisted of textiles, cereals, petroleum, machinery and sugar. Finally, in 1938 
the Italian government implemented a generous renegotiation of the SVEA debt of 
28 million francs of penal interest were written off. Italians shared their experience 
and expertise to bring “western” values to Albanian society. Italy introduced its own 
education system in accordance with the ideas of Mussolini and how the youth 
should be educated. There was even a delegation sent in 1937 to advise King Zog I on 
organizing youth committees similar to the fascist groups in Italy. By the mid 1930’s, 
Albania’s bargaining position was nil and Italy had almost subsumed the Albanian 
economy and culture. Yet, Italy, under the glare of disapproving international eyes, 
was still threatened by the possibility of Yugoslav patronage. 
Italian Strategic interests 
Any contributions Italy makes to the Albanian economy are and have always been 
based on the interest in the geostrategic positions of the two countries. Indeed, from 
Italy’s heel to Albanian gulf of Vlora, it is only 50 miles. As far back as the crumbling of 
the Ottoman Empire, Italy had begun to pursue an aggressive role towards controlling 
Albania. At that time, the Albanian territory was a war-torn nation, incapable of 
4 Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone. Mussolini, Study of a Demagogue (Odhams.1964.) 
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defending herself and on the verge of being partitioned by neighboring countries. 
Besides Italy, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria all had self aggrandizing plans involving the 
Albanian territory. It should be emphasized that Italy has always pursued a policy of 
colonization and annexation of the Albanian nation. So it seemed “business as usual” 
to step in and take a “fatherly” role in 1925. The desires of the principle Albanian 
elected officials, who wanted to rely on a foreign power from which they could take 
loans and bring the Albanian economy to its feet, matched perfectly with Il Duce’s 
plans. Since coming to power Mussolini had pursued a strategy based on invading 
weak countries and profiting from their resources. Albania was an especially prized 
plum. First, its strategic geographic position provided a perfect bridge to expand Italian 
influence in the Balkan Peninsula. Secondly, The Italian Dictator wanted to control the 
Adriatic Completely and having Albania under his protectorate would give him the 
right to control the Straights of Otranto and thereby secure the entire eastern coast 
of Italy from an imminent attack. Thirdly, control of these straights also afforded Italy 
control of the Yugoslav navy and international trade in and out of the Adriatic. When 
Italian troops invaded Greece on October 28th, 1940, it became abundantly clear that 
this strategy had worked. Fourthly, North Africa was on the top of the list after Albania 
to be controlled and without a full control of the western Balkans it would have made 
impossible to achieve these objectives in North Africa. At first, Mussolini was willing 
to collaborate, as he had done in the past, with the Yugoslav government and offered 
them a piece of the Albanian pie. Il Duce always had the idea of triumphant foreign 
policy that would challenge the world and he dropped negotiations with Yugoslavia. 
Italian Policy towards Albania was never based on altruistic principles. It was not really 
about making a contribution to the economy, but was rather more about securing the 
Italian interests across the Adriatic and waiting for the perfect moment to declare full 
authority over Albania and its neighbors. The assistance offered by Italy consisted of 
giving with one hand and taking double the amount with the other. The relations with 
the Italian government, as Zogu sorely discovered, were not at the level of genuine 
friendship. By 1939, the Italian ally was distrusted more than the enemy. 
The Italian Invasion Begins; the brake of the alliance (April 7th, 1939) 
In a matter of months Mussolini would decide to invade Albania, resulting in a 
complete destruction of the entire infrastructure that Italy had so carefully built. 
By the end of 1938, with the alliance between the two countries starting to crack 
and with a new government being elected in Yugoslavia, Mussolini was inspired to 
achieve, with considerably less effort, his intentions against Albania. For Mussolini, 
the Balkans, offered tremendous mineral wealth and strategic geographical position, 
but more importantly, he wanted to keep pace with his German buddy who had 
already annexed the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. To justify the invasion, if only 
to themselves and Germany, Italy prepared a report analyzing the importance of the 
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Albanian territory, and plans for its reclamation. It would take less than a year for 
Albania to be completely overwhelmed and gutted by its former ally, Italy. Mussolini 
continued in his intentions to invade all of the countries bordering Albania, and never 
wanting to be considered a second string ally of the axis. 
In Rome, indignation stemming from the jealousy of the German expansion in Europe 
preoccupied Mussolini who wanted to maintain an equal position in the “Pact of 
Steel.” The Italians continuously refused to revise their demands addressed to King 
Zog and Zog would not budge. Twice, King Zog I did not accept four requests made 
by the Italian foreign minister, Count Ciano. The first was the complete control of the 
infrastructure including ports, airfields and roads to be used in a situation when the 
Albanian sovereignty was in danger. Zog insisted that such an extension of the Italo-
Albanian alliance was not acceptable, and that Italian troops should enter the country 
only with the explicit request of the Albanians themselves. The second request was to 
have a secretary general in every ministry of the administration. Zogu wanted Italian 
staff members to be present only on an ad-hoc basis. The third was the request to give 
full civic and political rights to Italians in Albania. Zogu repeatedly opposed the idea 
of having foreign citizens to be part of the Albanian parliament, but he supported the 
idea of civil rights. The fourth and final request was to promote the Italian legation to 
an embassy, which was only a change in protocol. 
It should be pointed out that the King’s family was celebrating the birth of the prince 
named Leka, on April 5th. Having to deal with these political difficulties at this time, 
Zogu felt betrayed and could not stop his tears of disappointment. Meanwhile, a large 
number of people surrounded the king’s palace and requested weapons to fight the 
Italians. Zogu sent a telegram to Mussolini requesting to reopen the negotiations and 
wanted his old friend, General Pariani to be sent to Albania to direct the negotiations. 
Instead, Mussolini retorted with a fierce message saying that Zogu should send a 
representative to meet with General Guzzoni at the shores of Durrës (the site of the 
invasion). Realizing the irony of this offer, on the eve of April 7th, two hours before the 
invasion, the royal family, under Zogu’s supervision, left Albania and immigrated to 
Greece. This was severely difficult for the queen who had delivered Prince Leka only 
two days before. On the same morning, Count Ciano directed a flight operation over 
Albania spreading leaflets calling upon the people to demonstrate friendship to the 
Italian forces. 
In the port of Durrës the first invasion faced some resistance, but in the other ports 
the Italians disembarked quietly and without a problem. At two a clock the same day, 
King Zogu addressed the nation and called upon all the people to unite the fight for 
the freedom of their beloved nation. Unfortunately, no one organized this effort and 
there were only pockets of resistance here and there. For almost comical Italians, 
this was essential. The capture of Tirana, the capital, was of primary importance to 
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Mussolini and he was continuously asking how long it would take to reach it. In the 
first stages of the invasion, confusion ruled the Italian forces. They had a lack of radio 
communication and the troops could not report their positions before advancing. 
Furthermore, the specialist units were not prepared for the tasks they undertook in 
the invaded territory, and there were motor-cyclists, truck drivers and even generals 
who could not do their jobs. Often the roads were blocked by broken vehicles and 
the generals threw up their hands. But still they bore on to overthrow the Albanians. 
When they finally arrived at the capital, the streets were surprisingly empty, with no 
resistors in sight. 
There are several reasons why King Zogu was not willing to use force to confront the 
Italian troops. First, Zogu, did not have the support of the neighboring countries, 
Yugoslavia and Greece. Both of these countries did not want to supply armament to the 
Albanians, as they had been scared off by the Italian military capabilities. Secondly, the 
Yugoslav army declared that they would not enter the Albanian territory unless there 
was conflict in a Fifteen mile radius of the northeastern border. However, Yugoslavia 
was restrained from entering into Albanian territory by a previous agreement with 
Italy. Thirdly the Albanians showed little interest in fighting under the leadership of King 
Zogu. In fact, many Albanians spent their first week under Italian occupation debating 
whether Zogu was worth keeping as king. Zogu’s regime had failed to keep control 
of the local leaders because Italy had found a way to eliminate Zogu as a middleman 
and finance these “chieftains” directly. Whatever resistance there was to be, it would 
be waged by communist groups that fought tirelessly throughout the war. Mussolini 
was able to find a pretext in order to make his strategic invasion legitimate and as 
necessary as possible even from the Albanian point of view. The Italians pretended 
that in order to preserve peace in the Balkans it was important to overthrow the Zogu 
regime. It was interesting to see an Italian puppet become their number one enemy 
14 years later. Zogu explained, “I knew what Italians were after and I prevented them 
from getting control of the country by peaceful means…international politics left us no 
other choice to come to an understating with Italy. But the megalomania of the fascist 
regime made us certain that one day we should have to fight to defend ourselves.” 
5 Interestingly, count Ciano and his clique never really had to depose Zogu as his 
Albanian support had already dried up. And as for “preserving peace in the Balkans,” 
the Italians had merely blown apart a very fragile time of Balkan quietude. As a French 
Journalist once said, “Pays Balkanique, Pays Vulcanique,” peace in the Balkans is like a 
“peaceful” volcano.6 
5 Qosja, Rexhep. “La Question Albanaise.” (Artheme Fayard, Paris. 1995.) 
6 Schuman, Frederick L. “Night over Europe. The Diplomacy of Nemesis, 1939-1940.” 
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